Metaphysical Voyeurism in Philosophy and Science
In a post-Kantian era, in which the mysterious X of the Thing-in-Itself—reality apart from the human mind and apart from our own conceptual categories, whether objective conceptual categories as Immanuel Kant thought or subjective conceptual categories as various post-Kantian and postmodern philosophers have held—why is there a lingering fascination with metaphysics (within which I also include the natural and social sciences, insofar as scientists and practitioners take themselves to be uncovering something hidden about the nature of reality in doing science)?
This latent thirst for metaphysics—harkening back to Plato and his hidden realm of abstract forms—and even further back to Pythagoras with his Harmony of the Spheres—can be seen in the post-Kantian philosophies of Husserl (with his phenomenological analysis, a supposed return to Things-in-Themselves) and Heidegger (with his supposed return to “genuine” ontology in the question of Being). And while it is easy to write off this lingering appetite for metaphysics as mere Platonic vestiges in 19th- and 20th-century German and/or continental philosophy in general, the metaphysical desire in us knows no geographic bounds, as it is alive and flourishing both within the natural and social sciences and also within so-called Anglo-American analytic philosophy.
Most scientists don’t fancy themselves or believe themselves to be doing metaphysics when practicing their chosen science. And perhaps it’s true that the mid-level natural sciences—such as chemistry and biology—have their feet planted firmly on the empirical ground (emergent properties aside). Both the lower-level natural sciences—such as physics—and the higher level sciences—such as psychology—have a metaphysical element to them that cannot be ignored or reduced away.
Physics claims to be uncovering the hidden nature of reality—at least on a realist interpretation of theoretical concepts and entities in physics, such as subatomic particles in particle physics, strings in string theory, black holes in cosmology, and so on. Whether the objects of theoretical physics—with its quasi-mystical ontology—genuinely refer to something in reality or whether they are merely useful theoretical or mathematical constructs is an open question in the scientific realism/anti-realism debate. Most workaday physicists claim, however, to be uncovering (or at least they wish to be uncovering!) something essential about reality in developing their (hopefully) testable theories and hypotheses.
Psychology, too, at the other end of the higher/lower science spectrum, is steeped in metaphysics insofar as it claims to reveal something about the nature of consciousness. Even at their most naturalistic and reductionistic, psychologists and neuroscientists claim to be uncovering a hidden reality about consciousness and about ourselves—the deeper and underlying facts of how our grey matter produces the myriad psychological phenomena associated with what is traditionally called “consciousness.” It is this unconcealing, this supposedly revealing quality of the natural and social sciences that causes me to categorize them as broadly metaphysical in scope and intent, even when remaining fully grounded in and committed to a physicalist interpretation of reality or a reductionist methodology—or both.
But the specifics of which intellectual activity—whether philosophical or scientific—properly counts as metaphysical is not the true object of my reflection at the moment. I am interested in why and how both philosophy and science remain committed to the proposition that we humans are able to uncover something true and objective about reality even given the many post-Kantian barriers to objectivity—those opaque, human lenses through which we peer at reality only as if through a glass darkly: the lenses of culture, of history, of language, of interpretation, of metaphor, of representation, of perspective, of signification, and of many other kinds, all of which are good (or at least plausible!) reasons for thinking that we seldom, if ever, have direct perceptual or conceptual understanding of reality in itself—of the unknown X of the hidden, noumenal realm in Kant’s epistemology (itself containing some deeply mystical and metaphysical undertones).
Moreover, many scientists, metaphysicians, and psychologist are fully aware of these potential barriers to objectivity and our many biases against pure, unmediated access to reality in itself. Many are fully aware that our understanding of reality may only ever be incomplete and seen through human lenses, yet they persist in their metaphysical quest as if driven by instinct—like a proverbial moth to a flame (perhaps the flame of disappointment when reality remains ever veiled and shrouded in mystery).
Nietzsche claimed that there is something voyeuristic about both metaphysics and science—a metaphorical peek under the dress and beneath the veil of reality. This voyeuristic quality, Nietzsche claims, is an aspect of any metaphysical, scientific, or philosophical inquiry, in any time period and no matter whether that activity was on the “right” track or even fruitful. The alchemist and the magician and the astrologer believe themselves to be uncovering reality just as much as the physicist, the psychologist, and the Platonist:
So you believe the sciences would have emerged and matured, if they had not been preceded by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and witches who with their promises and false claims created a thirst, hunger, and taste for hidden and forbidden powers? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, No. 300: Preludes to Science)
Is it uncharitable for Nietzsche to lump the natural sciences in together with magic, alchemy, astrology, and witchcraft? Or is Nietzsche on to something important in claiming that science and pseudoscience have something essential in common—namely a psychological impulse toward the joy of unconcealment, of the forbidden and gnostic fruits tasted only by glimpsing with our rationality what nature has concealed from our senses? Both the scientist and the pseudoscientist experience the same voyeuristic pleasure from their respective activities, regardless of which methodologies and ontologies are more productive, accurate, or fruitful—regardless of which are “truer.” Both stake a gnostic claim to having access to the only peephole through which to catch a glimpse of reality—as if in possession of the Ring of Gyges, seeing all but himself or herself remaining unseen (how scandalous!).
Given the strength of human voyeuristic impulses in general, epistemological or otherwise, it’s no wonder that metaphysics continues to thrive even in a post-Kantian era. How could it be otherwise? It is difficult to imagine what it would even mean to do philosophy in the first place—indeed perhaps even to be rational at all—without presuming something of a metaphysical impulse, however illusory, i.e., without believing that we are uncovering something nature has tried her best to hide from us whenever we employ any scientific, philosophical, rational, or empirical faculties at our disposal whatsoever.
Even the most skeptical of philosophers—the David Humes and the Nietzsches and the Derridas—seem to delight in having shone a modicum of light on the vestments covering—or supposedly covering—reality (whether scientific or philosophical). This gnostic joyfulness permeates even the most skeptical or postmodern philosophies—it comes through loud and clear when reading Foucault or Lyotard or Baudrillard, for example. The joy of knowing can’t escape even those thinkers most critical of the very notion of knowing in the first place.
An interesting consequence of this reflection is that even the most seemingly non-metaphsyical worldview or field of inquiry is, in actuality, steeped in metaphysical joy, if not outrightly in metaphysical assumptions. Physicists and biologists and chemists—psychologists and sociologists—ethicists and metaphysicians—poets and philosophers alike—will continue to talk out of both sides of their mouth, as they have done since Pythagoras and Plato first gave us a gnostic glimpse into the realm of metaphysics and since the Kantian veil was finally draped over the elusive but tantalizing Thing-in-Itself. But since when has a veil or dirty lenses ever stopped the deepest voyeuristic impulses within the human mind?
We continue to gaze through the peepholes and lenses of our own human viewpoints, hoping to catch the briefest glimpse of the elusive things nature tries her best to remain concealed from us. And when we think we have a glimpse of that seductive, forbidden fruit of unseen reality, we rejoice and swell and ornament ourselves with full Nietzschean regalia while patting ourselves on the back for our own ingenuity—whether or not the peep show of reality was always ever merely an illusion.
For Further Reading:
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant
Republic by Plato
The Gay Science by Friedrich Nietzsche
